The Supreme Court should grant the petition to address how listeners’ rights can inform the often confounding distinction between content-neutral and content-based expression.
The First Amendment does not stop at the schoolhouse gate. In our increasingly polarized world, teachers, no less than students, deserve the protection of the First Amendment.
[I]n deciding for itself whether ratification was a “disfavored” or “improper” sort of retroactivity, the Wille panel usurped Congress’s role. This panel should not follow suit.
The elements essential to traditional causation—foreseeability, directness, proportionality, and individualized proof—cannot be satisfied by climate change litigation as [the youth plaintiffs represented by the organization "Our Children's Trust"] attempt here. The distance between individual energy policies and alleged climate harms erodes any meaningful causal connection under centuries of common law precedent.
With politicians and government agencies continuously devising new ways to collect, store, aggregate, and search individuals’ selectively shared private information, the time for [the Supreme] Court to affirm Fourth Amendment protections is at hand.
Courts must not help agencies to extend their powers beyond statutory and constitutional limits. But, for too long, agencies’ expansive views of their powers were assisted by judicial deference and acquiescence—at the expense of the people’s liberty and the rule of law.
[The Iowa Supreme Court] should hold that the Iowa Constitution, like the U.S. Constitution, prohibits the government from using the toehold of a tax debt to take more than what is owed without just compensation.
A constitutional protection that depends on a defendant’s willingness to incur additional financial and strategic exposure is illusory in practice. Article III and the Seventh Amendment require that the determination of liability for punitive monetary sanctions occur in court before a jury—not after the Executive has acted.
The Supreme Court has routinely looked to the common law when determining what the home encompasses for Fourth Amendment purposes. Doing so here confirms that a tenant’s apartment is his dwelling just the same as a standalone house. As such, it receives all the protections conferred by the common law, including curtilage protections.