[A]dministrative exhaustion should not be required for structural constitutional claims because it serves no institutional interests and the interests of the individual weigh heavily against such a requirement.
Under well-established state law, the best interests of the child is the “paramount” consideration in every child-custody determination. Except, that is, when an “Indian child” might be involved. The Indian Child Welfare Act's race-matched “placement preferences" cannot be squared with the traditional best-interests-of-the-child rule.
The Endangered Species Act’s text, structure, and history show that the “take” prohibition only covers affirmative actions that are performed directly and intentionally toward a particular animal. Accordingly, to the extent WaterWatch’s theory of liability is premised on allegations that the District’s mere ownership, operation, and control of a dam that might be incidentally injuring migrating coho or degrading or modifying coho habitat, WaterWatch cannot prevail, as a matter of law.
This Court should reaffirm that structural constitutional claims like those in Axon belong in federal district court. Doing so preserves the separation of powers and ensures that the Constitution’s structural guarantees remain more than empty promises.
For decades, the federal courts have recognized that the First Amendment protects the right to receive information. Yet this essential companion to the right to speak often gets forgotten, resulting in a lopsided jurisprudence that discounts the rights and interests of listeners.
The Constitution requires that liability rest on a direct, foreseeable, and proportionate connection between a specific defendant's conduct and a plaintiff's harm — and Boulder's climate claims satisfy none of those requirements.
The Town’s moratorium was a categorical taking of Evergreen’s right to exclude. Evergreen’s fundamental property rights were stripped away by government decree and it is now prohibited from excluding the tenants that, but for the moratorium, could have been excluded by law and by lease.
There is no public necessity exception to the Takings Clause and the Ninth Circuit was wrong to hold that there can be no compensable taking when police intentionally destroy a person’s business in pursuit of a fugitive.
There is no police-power exception to the Takings Clause, and the Seventh Circuit was wrong to hold that there can be no compensable taking of private property when police intentionally destroy a person’s home.