If the challenged executive orders in the four underlying cases were allowed to stand, the precedent would jeopardize the ability of amici, and any other litigant, to seek redress in the courts from unlawful government infringement on individual rights. Such an outcome cannot be abided.
After nearly a century of federal decisions routinely upholding what seem like unfettered delegations, it is imperative that this Court take a case to clarify that the nondelegation doctrine is alive and enforceable in the 21st century.
[I]n deciding for itself whether ratification was a “disfavored” or “improper” sort of retroactivity, the Wille panel usurped Congress’s role. This panel should not follow suit.
Courts must not help agencies to extend their powers beyond statutory and constitutional limits. But, for too long, agencies’ expansive views of their powers were assisted by judicial deference and acquiescence—at the expense of the people’s liberty and the rule of law.
A constitutional protection that depends on a defendant’s willingness to incur additional financial and strategic exposure is illusory in practice. Article III and the Seventh Amendment require that the determination of liability for punitive monetary sanctions occur in court before a jury—not after the Executive has acted.
Under the substantial-evidence standard, executive branch agencies are given either non-executive or unilateral power, and the judicial branch is ordered to refrain from exercising judicial power. This Court should discard this system of executive adjudication followed by judicial non-adjudication because it violates the Arizona Constitution’s separation of powers and the due process of law.
The political branches should not be allowed to devise a mechanism that allows them to escape political accountability. This Court should grant the petition [for certiorari] and reverse.
Courts construe laws. But they cannot make law. A law, particularly a criminal law, must be capable of being understood by ordinary people... Accordingly, this petition presents an opportunity to do what the Court should have done in Skilling: acknowledge that repairing a statute is beyond the scope of the judicial power and send the honest services law back to Congress.