[A]dministrative exhaustion should not be required for structural constitutional claims because it serves no institutional interests and the interests of the individual weigh heavily against such a requirement.
This Court should reaffirm that structural constitutional claims like those in Axon belong in federal district court. Doing so preserves the separation of powers and ensures that the Constitution’s structural guarantees remain more than empty promises.
If the challenged executive orders in the four underlying cases were allowed to stand, the precedent would jeopardize the ability of amici, and any other litigant, to seek redress in the courts from unlawful government infringement on individual rights. Such an outcome cannot be abided.
After nearly a century of federal decisions routinely upholding what seem like unfettered delegations, it is imperative that this Court take a case to clarify that the nondelegation doctrine is alive and enforceable in the 21st century.
[I]n deciding for itself whether ratification was a “disfavored” or “improper” sort of retroactivity, the Wille panel usurped Congress’s role. This panel should not follow suit.
Courts must not help agencies to extend their powers beyond statutory and constitutional limits. But, for too long, agencies’ expansive views of their powers were assisted by judicial deference and acquiescence—at the expense of the people’s liberty and the rule of law.
A constitutional protection that depends on a defendant’s willingness to incur additional financial and strategic exposure is illusory in practice. Article III and the Seventh Amendment require that the determination of liability for punitive monetary sanctions occur in court before a jury—not after the Executive has acted.